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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
Yel'tsin returns for a memoir moment 
Former President Boris Yel'tsin emerged from the quiet seclusion of his 
retirement to promote his latest memoir, Midnight Diaries. Among the revelations 
published thus far, Yel'tsin describes the secrecy surrounding his decision to 
resign last New Year's Eve. Claiming that even his wife Naina was not aware of 
the decision until just hours before his televised announcement, Yel'tsin writes 
that it took several conversations with Vladimir Putin before the current president 
was persuaded to take up the post. Putin had "the doubts of a strong person." 
(NEWSWEEK BOOK EXCERPT from PRNewswire, 8 Oct 00; via Johnson's 
Russia List) Keeping the resignation a surprise was clearly a calculated 
maneuver. In Yel'tsin's view his ability to spring unexpected decisions on the 
public had been a useful tool: "[S]uch political moves have always helped me..., 
sometimes even when it seemed hopeless." 
 
According to Yel'tsin, during the earlier decision to appoint Putin prime minister in 
August 1999, Unified Energy Systems (UES) chief and close presidential adviser, 
Anatoli Chubais, argued against Putin's nomination. Apparently he even 
attempted to convince Putin not to accept Yel'tsin's decision. It is unclear from 
reports just who informed the president of Chubais' opposition and his efforts to 
scuttle the president's selection of Putin.  
 
Yel'tsin also agreed to an interview with Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes (8 Oct 00, 
CBS Network) to publicize his new book. Wallace highlighted the former 
president's apparent disconnect from reality through his views on Russia's place 
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in the world, since Yel'tsin believes Russia has as much or more influence than 
the United States. More disturbing, however, was Yel'tsin's response to Wallace's 
recitation of the harsh conditions facing the Russian population, with its 
diminished standard of living: "Your data are wrong," Yel'tsin glared. "I don't 
believe your data." 
 
Putin makes a gesture, but is it empty?  
On 18 September, President Putin attended the opening ceremony of the Beis 
Menahem Jewish community center in Moscow. In a widely publicized address to 
the public, Putin praised the "upsurge" in the Jewish community as an "integral 
part of the general revival of folk traditions and spiritual values in Russia." 
(INTERFAX, 1658 GMT, 18 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0918, via World News 
Connection)  
 
The president's high profile visit and remarks were seen as an attempt to 
reassure Russia's Jewish population that the state's attacks on Vladimir 
Gusinsky were strictly for his business dealings rather than his faith or leadership 
in the Jewish community. A recent article by the Kremlin's head of the 
Information and Analytical Agency casts doubts on that goal, however. Writing in 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, the Kremlin analyst addresses the subject of national 
security in the era of globalization and the danger of a "world government" 
created by a "small elite." "The triumph of power in the World government by a 
Hasidic-paramasonic [sic] group demands urgent correction," the presidential 
apparatchik states. (The writer is unidentified in the news item: "Power Play" by 
Yevgenia Albats in THE MOSCOW TIMES, 5 Oct 00; via lexis nexis)  
 
President Putin clearly needs to clarify to the Russian population just what his 
administration's view is on relations with the Jewish community. 
 
GOVERNMENT  
Tentative campaign against Chubais  
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There seems to be an attempt to challenge the powerful position of UES Chief 
Anatoli Chubais. Recent weeks have seen rolling power outages, perhaps 
provocative, that resulted in harsh criticism of Chubais. On 21 September, the 
Moscow division of the federal tax police announced it had instituted criminal 
proceedings against UES for nonpayment of taxes. (ITAR-TASS, 1003 GMT, 21 
Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0921, via World News Connection) Later the same day, 
the investigation was said to have been dropped. Dmitri Zhurba, financial director 
for UES, commented that the company had been informed of an investigation on 
28 August. UES soon paid the amount in question to the state and believed the 
matter closed. (INTERFAX, 1412 GMT, 21 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-20000921, via 
World News Connection)  
 
Zhurba seemed puzzled that the police would choose to publicize the 
investigation nearly a month after the fact, but was reassured that the case would 
be closed. It seems likely that the announcement was politically motivated, 
however: Chubais has both friends and enemies in the current administration. 
Time will tell which faction wins out. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
Collective security & the Taliban  
The Collective Security Council (CSC) met, for the first time, on 28-29 September 
to discuss security challenges to the signatories of the Collective Security Treaty 
(CST): Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Of 
particular concern were Taliban forces engaged in combat with the anti-Taliban 
coalition about five or ten kilometers away from the Tajik-Afghan border and a 
large number of Afghan refugees at the border (estimated as high as 130,000 
persons, though other sources indicate that there is "no massive concentration" 
of refugees along the border, but rather only a few small groups of civilians from 
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nearby Afghan villages who are making no attempts to cross the border). (ITAR-
TASS, 0805 GMT, 3 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1003, and INTERFAX, 1329 GMT, 
29 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0929, via World News Connection) At that point 
Russian border guards and reserve troops had been placed on alert and were 
believed to "have reliably sealed off the Tajik-Afghan border, and especially the 
Panj and Moskva sectors." (ITAR-TASS, 1307 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0927, via World News Connection)  
 
Russian border guard commander Alexander Markin assured the press that even 
in the unlikely event that the Taliban forces challenged the border, "the Russian 
border guards... are strong enough to curb armed provocations." In addition, he 
declared that if the Afghan refugees gathered nearby attempted to cross the 
border in large groups, there were "ample means to maintain a normal regime on 
the border." (INTERFAX, 0626 GMT, 28 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0928, via 
World News Connection) 
 
On 7 October, however, the border guards themselves admitted that, without the 
backup of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, they would not be able to withstand a 
Taliban offensive for more than an hour. (RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV, 1700 GMT 7 
Oct 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) The situation is so 
acute that the Russian border guards are authorized to allow Ahmad Shah 
Masud's anti-Taliban units into Tajikistan, given the consent of political authorities 
in Tajikistan, if this is necessary for strategic considerations. (INTERFAX, 0742 
GMT, 5 Oct 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis)  
 
The 'dual-use' trap... 
On 3 October, the Primorye territory department of the Federal Security Service 
(FSB) charged yet another scientist, Professor Vladimir Shchurov, with divulging 
state secrets and illegal export of military technologies from Russia. Shchurov is 
head of the acoustic noises lab at the Pacific Oceanological Institute of the Far 
Eastern branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The process began over a 
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year ago, when acoustic modules were confiscated en route to a Chinese 
engineering university; the laboratories were sealed, and some documents 
confiscated. (INTERFAX, 5 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) Despite his assertions that 
the sale was approved by the FSB and by the customs officials, Shchurov has 
been placed under house arrest; if found guilty, he will face up to 30 years in jail. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 5 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
...and other judicial machinations  
Andrei Babitsky has been found guilty of using forged documents and fined 100 
minimum wages (about $300), but was acquitted under an amnesty. The eased 
sentence does not, however, satisfy the Radio Liberty reporter and his lawyers, 
and they plan to file appeals. (INTERFAX, 6 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
The tax police to gain prestige, power... 
Even though a tax ministry already exists, the tax police is seeking ministry 
status as a more powerful and comprehensive financial police. The director of the 
legal department of the Federal Tax Police Service, Leonid Kuznetsov, has 
announced that the bill on the Fiscal Police has been prepared and been 
submitted to the proper federal agencies, which have replied positively. Vladimir 
Beketov, the PR director of the tax police, explained that by cutting the number of 
organizations in Russia which inspect financial and production activities of 
enterprises from 30 to 10, "this measure will positively influence the performance 
of the country's economy." (IZVESTIA, 6 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) Alexander 
Pikaev of the Moscow Carnegie Center disagrees: He declared that "other power 
agencies will be upset if tax police acquire this status. I think they should strictly 
divide the powers of all these agencies before deciding to set up another 
ministry." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 6 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
...and pupils 
The Third Moscow Cadet Corps of Tax Police school was set up last month to 
train "the next generation of the elite tax corps." The children (142, including 20 
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girls, between the ages of 11 and 16) are taught to appreciate the societal 
necessity of paying taxes. They are also schooled in armed and hand-to-hand 
combat. (THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 6 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Moscow's about-face in Yugoslavia  
Last Friday Moscow finally recognized the results of the 24 September Yugoslav 
elections which catapulted opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica to the 
presidency and toppled Slobodan Milosevic. In a statement released by the 
Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia "has always been 
with Yugoslavia" and is "prepared to ... extend a helping hand ... to render 
assistance to the Yugoslav people..." (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 1025 GMT, 6 
Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
After two weeks of diplomatic fumbling and indecisiveness by the Kremlin, the 
belated recognition came during Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to 
Belgrade on 6 October. In an obvious bid to save face with the new Yugoslav 
president while still protecting the old one, Ivanov met with Kostunica and 
Milosevic separately. In contradictory statements, Ivanov pledged Moscow's 
readiness to assist the new democratic Yugoslav government as well as to 
support Mr. Milosevic's intention to continue his involvement in Yugoslav politics. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1400 GMT, 6 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Moscow's real interest, however, seems to be preservation of its unique bilateral 
relations with Yugoslavia regardless of who is president. Until the recent election 
crisis, Moscow's stance guaranteed it a place in international negotiations 
concerning the situation in Yugoslavia, since it was seen in the West as the only 
reliable diplomatic channel to Milosevic. Russia established this role for itself 
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during the Kosovo conflict with its staunch opposition to the Western bombing 
campaign. As a result, the Kosovo conflict allowed Moscow to use its relationship 
with its Serbian Orthodox "brothers" to build up its international prestige. Under 
the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia continued to support autocratic rule in 
Yugoslavia under Milosevic. However, on Friday, this policy came to an end as 
Putin was forced by the popular uprising in Yugoslavia to recognize Kostunica as 
the lawful president. (REUTERS, 6 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com)  
 
Despite Russia's apparent embrace of the "democratic forces" in Yugoslavia and 
the cordial meeting between Ivanov and Kostunica, Russia's political 
indecisiveness may have lost it a measure of goodwill with the new Yugoslav 
president. Moscow certainly won no favor from Kostunica by maintaining what 
Kostunica called an "unnecessarily reluctant" policy towards Yugoslavia in the 
weeks following the election. (REUTERS, 4 Oct, 00; via RussiaToday.com) 
 
Kostunica may have a point: As late as 1 October Sergei Ivanov still insisted in 
an interview with Russian television that Moscow had "no preference" for either 
candidate. (BBC MONITORING, 1 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) However, only days 
later Moscow showed its implicit loyalty to Milosevic when it upheld the Milosevic-
controlled Yugoslav Constitutional Court's ruling in favor of a runoff election. 
(REUTERS, 3 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) Kostunica in turn signaled his lack 
of trust for Moscow's offer to mediate the crisis when he labeled the proposal "too 
vague" and refused to travel to Moscow.  
 
But it remains to be seen whether or not there will be any longer-term political 
damage as far as the new Yugoslav leadership is concerned. After all, even 
though Russian recognition was late, ultimately Serbia's long-time supporter and 
ally did come through. Moreover, Russia is probably still a less unattractive ally to 
the nationalist Kostunica than the West. The first sign that this may have begun 
came when Ivanov, having just returned to Russia, indicated that Moscow would 
be President Kostunica's first foreign destination. (THE WALL STREET 
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JOURNAL, 9 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) Although the new Yugoslav administration 
has yet to confirm this news, Ivanov's remarks signal Russia's hope that 
Kostunica will forgive and forget Russia's prior indecisive behavior.  
 
Internationally, Moscow's support for Kostunica has been met with enthusiasm. 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has even called the decision "great 
news." (BBC WORLD SERVICE, 1710 GMT, 6 Oct 00; via BBC Online) But this 
enthusiasm will most likely be short-lived, especially in light of Russia's support of 
Milosevic's immunity from arrest and continued role in Yugoslav politics. This 
policy will keep Russia at loggerheads with the West, which according to UN war 
crimes prosecutor Carla del Ponte is already planning to indict Milosevic for 
"fresh war crimes charges in addition to the charges he already faces for alleged 
crimes in Kosovo." (BBC WORLD SERVICE, 1720 GMT, 6 Oct 00; via BBC 
ONLINE) 
 
Controversial atomic energy deal signed despite international restrictions  
Amidst the dramatic events in Yugoslavia, it is unsurprising that President Putin's 
first state visit to India transpired with little fanfare. But the emerging details of the 
trip suggest that the world should have been paying more attention to the visit 
after all.  
 
During his visit Putin signed a strategic partnership pact with India which will 
facilitate Russian arms transfers to India and could trigger further tensions with 
Pakistan. In the short to medium term, the transfers will include a T-90 tank deal, 
the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and an Su-30 aircraft production license. 
(ASIAN AGE, 5 Oct 00; FBIS-NES-2000-1005, via World News Connection) The 
sales not only will furnish Russia with needed revenue and help to bolster 
Russian-Indian relations, but also will provide India with an even greater ability to 
counter the Pakistani military forces. Any buildup theoretically could threaten the 
already precarious military balance in South Asia. Both India and Russia made 
public pledges that these transfers were not directed at any particular third party, 
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but the Pakistani press suggested that Islamabad should remain "watchful and 
plan effective steps to counter any negative effects" of the Indian arms buildup. 
(THE HINDU, 4 Oct 00; FBIS-NEW-2000-1004, via World News Connection, and 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 5 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com)  
 
Even more important than the conventional strategic partnership signed at the 
summit is a lesser known memorandum of understanding on atomic energy also 
signed by the Russian and Indian presidents. The contents of the memo have not 
been made public; however purportedly it commits Russia to assisting the Indian 
government's development of atomic energy. (THE HINDU, 5 Oct 00; FBIS-NES-
2000-1005, via World News Connection)  
 
The memorandum is bound to cause international controversy since Russia 
apparently will supply technology and assistance despite its membership in the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). As a member, Russia pledged in 1992 not to 
export nuclear technology to countries that had agreed to full-scope International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. These safeguards require 
international monitoring of civilian nuclear programs to prevent diversion of 
nuclear material for military purposes. In a move foreshadowing the events in 
India and effectively circumventing Russia's commitment to the NSG, however, 
on 7 May 2000 President Putin set new conditions for the transfer of atomic 
technology to countries that had not met these standards. Thus far, neither the 
NSG nor the IAEA has commented on the Russian-Indian plans. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS  
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Putin continues to nibble away at Russian federalism  
In an ominous move, President Putin has sent "envoys" to the federal districts to 
help voters receive "objective and reliable information" about candidates running 
for regional office. There is absolutely no legal basis for these envoys or their 
activities, beyond the presidential decree setting up the federal districts.  
 
Putin's latest move to "monitor" regional elections shows how potentially 
dangerous these federal districts can be. The districts operate outside of 
constitutional checks, and are wholly dependent upon Putin both for their form 
and function. He can, and apparently will, use them anyway he wishes, 
regardless of the fact that such activities seem to violate Russia's constitutional 
separation of powers. Putin does claim that "No one must be allowed to 
speculate on relations with the president, the presidential staff or the envoys. We 
did not and cannot have any special relations." But it is also clear that there are 
many ways to influence the outcomes of regional elections without outright 
association with or advocacy of particular candidates. (INTERFAX, 0816 GMT, 
28 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0928, via World News Connection)  
 
Putin continues to strengthen his control over the regions by subordinating the 
work of his regional representatives to the federal districts. At the end of 
September, Putin requested that his regional representatives submit reports to 
the heads of the federal districts, with an eye toward four topics: the relationship 
between the president's regional representatives and republican law, the purpose 
or role of self-government, assisting regional electoral commissions with the 
upcoming elections, and bringing regional legislation into line with federal law. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0902 GMT, 28 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000- 0928, via World News 
Connection)  
 
By the end of the year, 34 regions will have had gubernatorial elections. Many 
will also have held regional parliamentary and/or municipal elections. Putin 
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seems sure to want to take advantage of the opportunity to make his presence 
felt.  
 
No one doubts that some of Russia's regions were stretching their federal 
autonomy a bit at particular points in the past, but Putin's solution of super-
constitutional organization may prove to be a tonic more deadly than the disease 
it was designed to cure. The construction and passage of good law, and its fair 
and just application, should address the issue how to establish order in the unruly 
federation -- not attempt a return to the tried and troublesome habit of autocratic 
rule.  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES  
New parties keep popping up; it must be election season in the regions  
The Russian Stability Party (RSP) has been established in St. Petersburg, rising 
out of the ashes of the defunct Interregional Stability Party which had been 
founded in 1997. Because the party has 61 branches across the federation, it 
qualifies as a federal party. The head of the party will be Vladimir Sokolov, with 
Pavel Burov left in charge of day-to-day affairs. (ITAR-TASS, 1514 GMT, 30 Sep 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0930, via World News Connection)  
 
Although established in July, Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev's political 
movement, "Russia," is preparing for its first congress where its program will be 
determined. The idea is that it will be an ally of the Communist Party and will join 
the People's Patriotic Union of Russia. Seleznev claims that "Russia" will infuse 
new "freshness" into the Left. (ITAR-TASS, 1229 GMT, 20 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0920, via World News Connection)  
 
Three points can be made here: First, the Left, or more specifically the 
Communist Party, apparently is stale. Second, it is in fact so desiccated that one 
of its two leaders was unable to "freshen it up" from within and had to create a 
new movement. Third, if the new movement "Russia" is to be made up of the 
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same faces that are apparently now so stale, it is hard to see how the Left can be 
made squeezably soft in the near future even with such an attractively titled 
movement. Perhaps the communists should follow the options of cooks when 
faced with a loaf of stale bread: Throw it out, reconstitute it by diluting it, or grind 
it up and add it to other things. 
 
The all-Russian movement Entrepreneurship Development has also announced 
that it will transform itself into a federal political party, its leader Ivan Grachev 
announced in St. Petersburg. The movement already has branches in 60 
regions. The general aim of the new party is to include "balanced ideas of both 
developing entrepreneurship and market relations and consolidating the social 
constituent of a state policy." (ITAR-TASS, 1546 GMT, 28 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0928, via World News Connection)  
 
Admittedly, Russia's post-Soviet political institutions are still in their infancy, 
which partly explains why single-issue or single-personality parties and 
movements keep emerging, even while the same politicians call for the 
construction of a few, strong parties. These micro-parties and movements are 
often reservoirs for the personal ambitions of particular men, and infrequently 
women. It is hard to see how the common good is served. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE  
Growing up is hard to do  
While watching the throngs of jubilant demonstrators outside the parliament 
building in Belgrade, it was easy to be swept by emotion. It was also easy to be 
reminded of the birth of independent Ukraine. 
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Over a decade ago, Ukraine's own strongman was swept away by the rising tide 
of "glasnost'" and the country's unique brand of nationalism. Volodymyr 
Shcherbytskyi's removal signaled a new era of hope and promise. This 
expectation seemed justified, as, just over two years later, in a spectacular, 
incredible turn of events, Ukraine grabbed its independence and took charge of 
its own affairs. For the first time, Ukraine was independent. Or more precisely, 
Ukraine was a sovereign country. 
 
In reality, facing technological and agricultural industries in ruins, lacking a capital 
base, largely devoid of an experienced, well-trained elite, challenged by 
nationality questions, pressured by its "big brother" to the East, left with the 
aftereffects of Chornobyl, and lacking energy resources, Ukraine was anything 
but truly independent. Unfortunately, this economic independence still has not 
arrived. Even more important, an open society based on strong, clear laws and a 
vigorous civil component has failed to materialize fully. Instead, a complex, 
confusing, often paradoxical mix of laws, principles and policies has developed in 
Ukraine. With one hand, it grabs hold of the West, but with the other, it still clings 
firmly to the old, ingrained Party ways. 
 
During the last month, President Leonid Kuchma diligently courted the IMF and 
World Bank, touting the progress of his reform-oriented government. This 
progress is actually considerable. From new more transparent privatization 
procedures, to the start of agricultural reform, the government is definitely moving 
toward a more open, Western-style economy. At the same time, however, 
Kuchma is presiding over a government that has become ruthless toward 
independent-minded media outlets -- making use of very familiar "persuasion" 
tactics. From conducting sudden and groundless searches, to following reporters, 
instituting tax audits and denying access to printing and distribution facilities, the 
press has been vigilantly targeted by officials. 
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Not until this month, however, had a journalist previously harassed by the secret 
police actually disappeared. Heorhiy Honhadze, the editor of the investigative 
online newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda, simply vanished on his way home from 
work. Honhadze recently had been investigating corruption among high-ranking 
officials, and, according to the organization Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), "had 
already been interrogated several times by the police." In a letter to Kuchma, 
RSF criticized the "worsening of the situation regarding the freedom of the press 
in Ukraine" and called on Kuchma not only to locate Honhadze but also to 
"intervene" against the recent attacks on the press. (RSF LETTER, 19 Sep 00)  
 
During his many comments about the reforms of his government, Kuchma has so 
far avoided any mention of the RSF letter. He has also remained relatively quiet 
about the fact that his deputy prime minister responsible for the energy ministry, 
Yulia Timoshenko, is being investigated for possible connection to the money 
laundering carried out by former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Unfortunately 
this fits in well with the recent finding by the World Bank that the Ukrainian 
government is massively corrupt, and has been getting worse over the last 
several years. 
 
On the other hand, as the Honhadze drama played out, Ukraine was taking part 
in the OSCE mission to Nagorno-Karabakh, successfully hosting NATO 
"emergency situation" exercises and strengthening its support for GUUAM. 
Thanks to more efficient administrative procedures, it was also collecting an 
unprecedented percentage of payments for electricity and taxes, and posting a 
GDP growth of over 5 percent in the first eight months of the year. All of this led 
Johannes Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, to laud the "visible progress 
in the economy and many positive developments in the budget process, fiscal 
discipline, and administrative reform." (WORLD BANK GROUP NEWS 
RELEASE, 6 Oct 00) 
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Shortly thereafter, Wolfensohn, with the blessing of the IMF, announced a 
resumption of World Bank loans to Ukraine to support reform of its coal industry. 
Ukraine soon will receive two tranches totaling $70 million. Wolfensohn also 
suggested that the country would receive another $100 million for restructuring 
the financial sector. 
 
There is no doubt that Ukraine has completed much hard work and deserves to 
have its World Bank loans resumed. There is also no doubt that, in many ways, 
after almost 10 years of sovereignty, Ukraine fails to meet the very basic 
standards of modern Western society. This is a lesson that almost certainly will 
be learned by those demonstrators in Belgrade. An entire society, unfortunately, 
cannot change with the fall of a dictator -- or an empire. Perhaps, however, the 
society can transform itself slowly, over time, with prodding support and an 
abundance of patience. As Wolfensohn noted in Kyiv, in a statement that just as 
easily could fit Belgrade, "This is a very important moment .... There is a lot to be 
proud of, although there is still a lot to achieve." (BLOOMBERG, 1213 ET, 6 Oct 
00)  
 
BELARUS  
Russia to the rescue  
Have "democratic principles" and "support for law" won out again in Russia? 
Seeing that the Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was becoming 
increasingly isolated because of the refusal of many Western countries to 
recognize his upcoming parliamentary elections, Russia has stepped in to the 
breach. On 29 September, the world-renowned "democrat" Gennady Seleznev 
(of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) announced that Russia will 
send observers to Belarus to monitor the elections and ensure that they are free, 
fair and democratic! (INTERFAX, 1107 GMT, 29 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0929, 
via World News Connection)  
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Judging from past performance, Russia's arrival on the scene should be 
welcomed by international leaders. After all, just two weeks ago, Russian 
observers of the Yugoslavian elections announced that the process "met all the 
requirements of international law," and said they "did not hear a single complaint 
about people ignoring or suppressing anything during the poll." (ITAR-TASS, 
1055 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0927, via World News Connection) It is 
quite possible that these same observers -- technically members of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia -- will be the 
persons "observing" in Belarus. So, the international community, which has been 
increasingly concerned about arrests of opposition members calling for an 
election boycott, should give a sigh of relief and relax. Obviously, there is nothing 
to worry about. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan pact: implications for the Collective Security Treaty 
The recently signed Kyrgyz-Uzbek security pact could undermine Russia's 
attempts to create a Russian-led Central Asian bloc under the CIS Collective 
Security Treaty and re-establish itself more solidly in the territory of the post-
Soviet republics. The military cooperation agreement, the first of its kind between 
two Central Asian states, may also indicate that the CIS is considered by some 
Central Asian members to be an "empty shell" in the defense against "non-
traditional" security threats, such as international terrorism and organized crime.  
 
The security accord was signed in Bishkek during Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov's official visit to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev explained 
that the agreement was precipitated by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
strikes from bases in Tajikistan in a mountainous region bordering southern 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. (INTERFAX, 1039 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
 17 
2000-0927, via World News Connection) Karimov explained that the UN Security 
Council should "convene an emergency session" to discuss solutions to Central 
Asian security problems. The Uzbekistan president added, however, that the 
Central Asian states should exercise responsibility for their own security and take 
"concrete steps" to reinforce their armed forces and border guards. (INTERFAX, 
1010 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0927, via World News Connection) The 
Uzbek president's comments may signal displeasure with the way the CIS (i.e., 
Russia) has handled regional security problems or simply may indicate 
Uzbekistan's desire for regional hegemony. Nevertheless, the security pact itself 
is a watershed for Central Asia. While Karimov referred to Russia's strategic 
designs in the area, he also stated that Russia should align its policies with the 
interests of the Central Asian states. (INTERFAX, 0702 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0927, via World News Connection) Clearly the states are trying to 
control the level of assistance their stronger neighbor may provide.  
 
Along with increasing security cooperation among themselves, Central Asian 
states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are forging closer ties 
with NATO and its members (i.e., Turkey and the US) to enhance regional 
security. The recent exercise of the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion, 
CENTRASBAT, in Kazakhstan under the NATO Partnership for Peace program, 
for example, went a long way toward improving military skills and capabilities, as 
well as increasing military contacts. CENTRASBAT exercises, launched in 1996, 
enable the Central Asian states to cooperate more closely with NATO 
peacekeepers and, more importantly, with each other, by testing communications 
and coordination between national delegations and capitals, as well as crisis 
response mechanisms. According to US General Henry Shelton, chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, these peacekeeping exercises play an important role in 
bilateral relations and regional security. (ITAR-TASS, 1515 GMT, 13 Sep 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0913, via World News Connection)  
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Turkey is also pressing its politico-military, cultural and historical ties with Central 
Asia. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet will visit Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan between 16 and 20 October, underscoring Ankara's 
determination to play a more active role in Central Asian regional security. 
(ANATOLIA, 1154 GMT, 29 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0929, via World News 
Connection) A Turkish-Uzbek military-technical agreement could emerge from 
these talks. Tashkent is already expanding its security cooperation with Ankara 
by sending Uzbek counter-terrorism units to Turkey for training in mountainous 
areas and high elevations, places where guerrilla forces are known to operate. 
(INTERFAX, 1515 GMT, 18 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0918, via World News 
Connection) 
 
While security relationships with NATO, Turkey and the US, as well as other 
regional powers like China and Iran, may provide workable alternatives to the 
CIS, Russia will continue to wield considerable influence in its "near abroad" due 
to its geopolitical position and links to Central Asia. According to the president of 
Kyrgyzstan, "Russia, as a great power, could become the main force in the 
formation of a system of stability and security in Central Asia." (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 23 Aug 00; via the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) Air 
defense integration is one of several areas that have been successful within the 
CIS framework. (CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST, 27 Sep 00) With so 
many contradictions, it may be premature to sound the death-knell of the CIS.  
 
Some Central Asian states still rely heavily on Russia to varying degrees for 
security and defense. With 10,000 Russian border guards and a motorized 
division permanently stationed on its territory, Tajikistan depends almost entirely 
on Russia for border security. Russia recently "hardened" its defensive positions 
along the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan in response to IMU 
incursions into three Central Asian republics and the Taliban offensive in 
northern Afghanistan. (ITAR-TASS, 1649 GMT, 1 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1001, 
via World News Connection) Russia also has intensified its security cooperation 
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with the Central Asian states and has reinforced its presence along CIS southern 
borders within the CIS framework. (ITAR-TASS, 1451 GMT, 26 Sep 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0926, via World News Connection)  
 
Moscow cites the instability created on the southern borders of the CIS as a deep 
security concern. Russian President Vladimir Putin asserts that the dangerous 
situation created on the Tajik-Afghan border and instability in Central Asia as a 
whole have serious implications for Russian security. According to Putin, 
destabilization in Central Asia "would likely have a negative effect on the situation 
in Russia as well," and Russia would prevent the Afghan conflict from "spilling 
into the former USSR territory." (INTERFAX, 0940 GMT, 30 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0930, via World News Connection) The secretary of the Russian Security 
Council, Sergei Ivanov, said during a meeting in Moscow in late September that 
security council representatives from CIS member states have discussed the 
situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, as well as the shaping of forces and 
defense within the Collective Security Treaty. (ITAR-TASS, 1446 GMT, 29 Sep 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0929, via World News Connection) Whether the CIS 
establishes itself as an effective collective security framework in the next few 
years remains to be seen. Even Russia calls into question the validity of the CIS 
for use in security matters by continuing to pursue bilateral security relationships 
with the Central Asian states.  
 
The Kyrgyz-Uzbek security pact is a step in the right direction in that it 
consolidates regional security, and adds a new dimension to regional 
cooperation. This "burgeoning" intra-regional security and defense cooperation 
and potential re-alignment with the West eventually could replace the CIS 
framework. NATO and the US, however, are maintaining a low profile militarily in 
Central Asia using NATO's Partnership for Peace program as their primary 
engagement tool. Russia is likely to continue using the CIS to assert its presence 
on its southern periphery. 
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Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
The countries that play together...  
A glance at the calendar of events for the last few months alone provides clear 
indication that, should NATO members decide against inviting the Baltic states to 
join the alliance in the next round of enlargement, the reason will be total 
acquiescence to an outdated notion of "spheres of influence," rather than any 
inability by the Baltics to coordinate with Western military structures.  
 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joint exercises scheduled with almost 
everybody in the months of September and October. Most of the exercises focus 
on training that provides benefits to the Baltics, an important consideration for the 
countries which are working toward the optimal defense allocation of two percent 
of the annual budget.  
 
However, while the short-term usefulness offers justification for the exercises in 
their own right, the long-term benefit -- getting accustomed to working with 
Western military structures -- is significant. Open Spirit 2000, a week-long 
minesweeping exercise covering 67 square nautical miles, involved the 
participation of the Baltic states along with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In all, 18 ships representing 
11 countries removed some potential explosive dangers in the Baltic Sea. (BNS, 
1014 GMT, 18 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0918, via World News Connection)  
 
The following week, Baltic troops trained with their counterparts from Canada, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Norway and Denmark. 
Under the guidance of the NATO Atlantic Ocean marine unit, participants of the 
Passex 2000 exercises focused on maneuvering, extending aid to other ships 
and cargo delivery. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 20 
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Sep 00) Such international activities are paying off: Following a meeting in Vilnius 
with President Valdas Adamkus, David Weisman, the US military representative 
to NATO, said Lithuania is one of the best-prepared applicants to the alliance. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 25 Sep 00)  
 
Cooperation training also was the focus of Nordic Peace 2000 from 26 
September to 6 October, which featured officers from the Nordic and Baltic 
countries, as well as representatives from the Danish Human Rights Center, the 
International Red Cross, the Danish Red Cross, the Swedish Red Cross, and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The games were designed to 
improve interaction among military headquarters for international peace-keeping 
and humanitarian operations. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 
GMT, 25 Sep 00) At the very least, some of the training must be having the 
desired effect: 30 volunteers from a Lithuanian motorized infantry brigade have 
headed to Kosovo, where they will join a battalion of Polish servicemen. This is 
the first peacekeeping mission of the motorized brigade, and the third 
deployment of Lithuanian troops to Kosovo. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1700 GMT, 23 Sep 00)  
 
On the bilateral level, Lithuanian and British riflemen have been training together 
since 23 September. Other Lithuanian troops participated in Baltico 2000, joint 
war games with Italy. Elsewhere, British instructors traveled to Adazi to train 
Latvian troops as part of the Partnership for Peace program. Those exercises 
focused on military leadership principles as well as the British army's basic 
tactics in fighting armored vehicles. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1000 GMT, 18 Sep 00) 
 
In addition, the deputy defense ministers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
concluded military cooperation agreements with Poland for next year which 
envisage a substantial increase in joint training exercises: 66 events are 
scheduled with Lithuania; Latvia has 40 planned; and Estonia will hold 17 joint 
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ventures with Poland. At the press conference, Bogdan Klich, the deputy defense 
minister for Poland, reiterated his country's support of Baltic aspirations to join 
NATO. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 27 Sep 00)  
 
Moreover, in a continued attempt to improve coordination among themselves, 
Baltic forces also held regional training without the West. Amber Sea 2000, 
begun on 7 October, is intended to facilitate joint actions in extreme situations 
and during armed resistance. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 
GMT, 27 Sep 00) In addition, BALTBAT, the Baltic peacekeeping battalion, held 
field training exercises, which included evacuations of injured persons with the 
assistance of helicopters. (LETA, 1338 GMT, 21 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0921, 
via World News Connection) 
 
...Don't have to pay together  
While the Baltic countries are eager to show the West that they can work 
together militarily, on the economic front there was no pretense of parity. Estonia 
continues to reap the benefits of its early austerity program, with a steadily 
improving economic situation. Having earned positive reports of its economy 
(ETA NEWS AGENCY, 1259 GMT, 27 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0927, via World 
News Connection), Estonia may have outgrown the need for the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) memoranda. Following a meeting with IMF representative 
John Odling-Smee, Estonian Finance Minister Siim Kallas explained that Tallinn 
has not needed to make use of the credit possibilities offered by such 
memoranda, and other types of financial agreements are being discussed. (ETA 
NEWS AGENCY, 0855 GMT, 25 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0925, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Lithuania's economic star is also shining, as it attracted several offers of 
financing at the annual IMF and World Bank meetings in Prague. Senior officials 
from the finance ministry met with representatives of international banks on the 
sidelines of the meetings. According to an advisor to the finance minister, several 
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banks were asking about Lithuania's borrowing needs and touting lower interest 
rates. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 26 Sep 00)  
 
Alas, the forecast was not quite so good for Latvia. The World Bank reported that 
Latvia was unable to meet all of its previously promised undertakings -- such as 
privatization and institutional reforms -- and would face serious negotiations next 
year if another loan is sought. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 
GMT, 26 Sep 00) However, the IMF reported that cooperation with Riga has 
been successful, and the only problem is Latvia's higher than expected budget 
deficit. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 26 Sep 00) 
 
Law and disorder 
The judicial systems in Estonia and Lithuania recently have received virtual slaps 
on the wrists. Two cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights in 
The Hague have ended unhappily for the states concerned. The court ruled to 
strike from its list a complaint lodged by a former prisoner against Estonia who 
had claimed prison authorities regularly opened his correspondence with the 
president, interior ministry, the European Commission of Human Rights and 
other international organizations. However, the case was not dismissed for lack 
of cause: The proceedings were terminated because the Estonian government 
had reached a settlement earlier with the plaintiff, Vitali Slavgorodski, whereby 
the government will pay 67,567 kroons (US$3,800) to cover any damage and 
costs incurred, as well as the plaintiff's income tax obligations. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 25 Sep 00) 
 
The same court ruled that Lithuania had violated the rights of Henrikas Daktaras 
by failing to ensure fair court proceedings. Daktaras is serving a 7.5-year 
sentence for racketeering and perverting the course of justice. He charged that 
he did not receive a fair trial because the tribunal was neither independent nor 
impartial, and because he was not presumed innocent until found guilty. The 
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complete ruling will be made public on 10 October. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 28 Sep 00) 
 
Defendants are not the only persons railing against the judicial system, either. In 
a report recently released by the security police in Estonia, the slow pace of the 
courts is hindering crime fighters. The report charges that the deterrent aspect of 
criminal prosecution diminishes when the defendant has time to forget the nature 
and circumstances of the crime, and therefore draws no connection to any 
penalty imposed; moreover, delayed proceedings cause the press to lose interest 
in cases, so the preventive effect of punishment upon members of the general 
public is lost. "It is remarkable that of the 30 criminal cases the security police 
referred to the courts in 1999, only four have reached a conclusion, and four out 
of 38 cases handed over in 1996-97 are still without effective court ruling," the 
report stated. "At the same time, it appears from court practice that hearings in 
the district or state courts are not the main delay. Generally, proceedings in the 
lower-level courts take the most time," the report added. (BNS, 1313 GMT, 22 
Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0922, via World News Connection) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Election results 
Preliminary results from the 8 October parliamentary elections indicate that most 
Lithuanians were not thrilled with the ruling coalition, a sentiment which should 
come as no surprise to anyone who followed the reaction to the sale of a portion 
of the state oil industry to the US-based Williams International last year. The 
agreement went through over the protests of many politicians, including then-
Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas who resigned rather than sign the deal, and has 
since continued to generate controversy. Indeed, parties in the Social Democratic 
Coalition, the leading vote-getter in Sunday's elections, had directed much of the 
opposition to the sale. 
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The Social Democratic Coalition, led by former President Algirdas Brazauskas, 
won 51 seats in the 141-seat parliament. The coalition, comprised of the 
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the 
Union of Russians of Lithuania and the New Democracy Party, won 23 seats in 
single-seat constituencies and 28 seats under proportional representation. The 
ruling Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives, on the other hand, were 
issued a resounding defeat, garnering just 9 seats in the new Seimas (one 
single-seat constituency and eight seats under proportional representation). The 
Lithuanian Liberal Union won 18 seats each in single-member constituencies and 
proportional representation, for a total of 36. The New Union-Social Liberals 
earned 11 seats in single-seat constituencies and 16 seats under proportional 
representation. 
 
While the four parties/coalitions listed were the only groups to get the minimum 
number of votes required to obtain seats through proportional representation, 
other parties did wrangle a few seats in single-seat constituencies: the Lithuanian 
Farmers' Party obtained 4 seats; Lithuanian Center Union, 2; the Electoral Action 
of the Lithuanian Poles, 2; and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, 2. 
Other parties obtained one seat through single-seat constituencies: the 
Lithuanian Freedom Union; the Moderate Conservative Union; the Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Union; the Union of Young Lithuania; the New Nationalists 
and Political Prisoners; and the Modern Christian Democratic Union. Three seats 
will go to self-nominated candidates. Official results have to be confirmed by 15 
October. (LITHUANIAN RADIO, 1000 GMT, 9 Oct 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
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